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Within the framework of the CRIMPREV coordination action (As-
sessing Deviance, Crime and Prevention in Europe), ﬁnanced by the 
European Commission and implemented by a multidisciplinary con-
sortium of European participants, the University of Liège organised 
on April 10th and 11th 2008 a seminar devoted to the study of inse-
curity and the phenomenon of social exclusion.
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1 Please note that Workpackage 4 aims at achieving the compilation of  knowledge about the 
perceptions of  insecurity and of  crime. Based on a (socio-historical) approach of  the various 
knowledge compiled together in various ﬁelds of  the European Union, it aims at a better 
understanding of  the impact in terms of  quality of  life and social cohesion (discriminations, 
mechanisms of  reject, social segregation) of  the development of  the feeling of  insecurity. The 
various seminars are devoted to the study of  the wider characteristics likely to inﬂuence fear of  
crime and the feeling of  insecurity (for instance, in terms of  evolution of  the informal social 
control, the increase of  the public expectations and the transformations of  the European soci-
eties). A special attention was given to the way the media cover the legal issues.
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2This seminar focused on the “Perception of crime, insecurity and so-
cial segmentation”. What consequences of insecurity and perception 
of crime can we identify in discriminations and social segregations 
and in the possible effects generated by the feeling of insecurity? 
What implications can fears have on social relations? In these con-
texts, how can we understand the phenomenon of rejection (which 
can even lead to ghettoisation)?
The study was undertaken using a resolutely comparative perspec-
tive. The following fellows attended the seminar: Sophie Body-
Gendrot (University of Paris V-Sorbonne), Anna Barker, Sarah 
Blandy and Adam Crawford (University of Leeds), Zoltan Csefal-
vay (University of Budapest), Paul Curvers (Prevention Plan, City 
of Liège), Cândido Da Agra (University of Porto), Jean-Pierre Goor 
(King Baudouin Foundation, Brussels), Axel Groenemeyer (Univer-
sity of Dortmund), Magnus Hornqvist (University of Stockholm), 
Véronique Ketelaer (Forum Belge pour la Prévention et la Sécurité 
urbaine - Belgian Forum for Urban Safety), Krzysztof Krajewski 
(University of Jagiellonian, Krakow), Helmut Kury (University of 
Fribourg), Paul Ponsaers (University of Gand), Rita Raposo (Uni-
versity of Lisbon), Anabel Rodriguez Basanta (University of Bar-
celona), Klaus Sessar (University of Hamburg), Bernarda Tominc 
(University of Maribor), René Van Swaaningen (University of Rot-
terdam), Daniel Ventre (GERN – CNRS, Paris), Sirpa Virta (Uni-
versity of Tampere), Christina Zarafonitou (University Pantheon of 
Athens), Mathieu Chapeau, Bertrand Fincoeur, André Lemaître and 
Jacques Teller (University of Liège).
The main issues covered during the seminar concerned the impact of 
insecurity and/or the feeling of insecurity on the quality of life, and 
social cohesion. In this framework, the questions of social exclu-
sion and the meaning of urban space and gated communities were 
tackled.
We are presenting here the synthesis of the work and opinions that 
fed these two days of discussions.
I – ON THE PERCEPTION OF CRIME AND THE FEELING OF INSECURITY
1 – Variability and variety of statistics
Criminology makes a traditional distinction between insecurity and 
the feeling of insecurity. While insecurity describes a state of society 
which some try to objectivise by collecting statistics on crime, carry-
ing out surveys on victimisation or on self-reported delinquency, the 
feeling of insecurity is traditionally associated with the fear, which 
is then even more subjective, of delinquency experienced either per-
sonally or by family and friends (avoiding going out at night, fear 
of being victimised, trust in the police, etc). According to the tradi-
tional distinction, insecurity can also refer to a more abstract concern 
in terms of delinquency. Insecurity and the feeling of insecurity are 
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“real” or “objectivised” insecurity increases the public fear of delin-
quency, or be inversely proportional to each other. The feeling of in-
security can indeed vary either way, irrespective of the delinquency 
ﬁgures.
The seminar mainly aimed at reminding of the distinction between 
insecurity and the feeling of insecurity and illustrating both notions 
and their possible discrepancy using various examples from other 
countries.
Broadly speaking, and since we should remain careful in this context 
of global comparisons, the perception of insecurity in northern Eu-
ropean countries differs from that in southern and eastern European 
countries. Therefore, when we analyse the feeling of insecurity ex-
perienced by the Europeans when they ﬁnd themselves in the street 
at night, Scandinavian and northern European countries (Iceland, 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland) show much 
lower ﬁgures than Mediterranean and eastern countries (Bulgaria, 
Poland, Greece, Italy, Portugal). The population in these latter coun-
tries report a higher level of fear of crime. Amongst the factors that 
determine the level of fear of crime, the overall public nuisances, es-
pecially those related to drugs, have a predominant position. The vis-
ibility of deviant acts, especially discarded litter, grafﬁti and gather-
ings of young people, play a major role on the population’s feeling of 
insecurity. The ﬁght against these public nuisances, which assumes 
that reducing the problem is most often and simply achieved through 
the erasure of its visibility, is thus now considered as a key objective 
for the political decision-makers. The problem of public nuisance 
does not lie in the act itself but rather in its denunciation by the 
population. Complaints are triggered by the visibility of the act more 
than by its reality. The governing bodies, aware of the importance of 
what is at stake on the social and electoral levels, resort then largely 
to propositions of actions designed for ﬁghting against this feeling 
of insecurity that is sometimes deemed as serious as a real insecurity 
which is, in other respects, difﬁcult to measure.
Statistics and various classiﬁcations of the degree of various types 
of crime or of the measures of the police’s effectiveness ﬂourish ex-
ponentially virtually everywhere in Europe. These assessment tools, 
regularly contested by those who are denounced as the “bad pupils”, 
actually face the traditional pitfalls of this ﬁeld of study. The po-
lice’s proactivity and the usual black ﬁgure (undeﬁned zone between 
“real” crime and “apparent” crime) and the grey ﬁgure (gap between 
“apparent” crime and the crime that is actually punished) are thus 
often put forward in order to legitimise the criticising of the methods 
used in this type of surveys.
However, different elements still come back constantly, as is the case 
of the fear of young people, which is pinpointed by numerous Euro-
pean studies.
42 - A “youth peril”?
According to English studies presented in the seminar, the popula-
tion of legal minors can be held responsible for crime only in a very 
small proportion of cases. Statistics also show that the number of 
young people responsible for crimes is decreasing and that, on the 
contrary, these young people are among the most victimised popula-
tion. However, representations commonly associate youth with de-
linquency. Should we then speak of a “youth peril”, and, if so, what 
can we learn from it?
The theme of juvenile delinquency is one of the most tackled by 
scientiﬁc literature. The term is however misleading in so far as it 
conveys a false impression of homogeneity, which does not actually 
exist. Should we approach the young population’s maladjustment 
in terms of cultural conﬂicts (divergence of moral norms between 
adults and young people) or regard the young people as a fragile 
population, eager to achieve objectives but incapable of doing so 
legally (which is often used to explain the delinquency of young 
people from disadvantaged social classes), the youth is still often 
considered as the main source of insecurity. Robert and Lascoumes 
(1974) evoked, more than thirty years ago, the existence of “anti-
youth racism” that was then expressed by the dramatisation of their 
behaviour and a harsh social reaction that could only increase this 
social segregation by encouraging a withdrawal that precipitates 
their integration into sub-cultures.
The seminar was the opportunity to analyse some features of the 
issue in Britain and to exploit some elements for the purpose of gen-
eralisation. In 2003, in the frame of the ﬁght against (the feeling of) 
insecurity, Britain adopted the Antisocial Behaviour Act. Amongst 
the powers granted by this regulation, the local authority has the 
right to pronounce a “dispersal order”, in speciﬁc cases, targeting 
the young people whose gathering is deemed intimidating. Here it is 
really the feeling of insecurity more than the “objective” insecurity 
that is taken into account. On analysing the practical aspect of the 
surveys, we can observe that, contrary to expectations, these orders 
are most often given in areas where the crime rate is comparatively 
low but the feeling of insecurity high, which is translated into the 
maladjustment of the distribution of risk or victimisation with the 
topography of this type of interventions. In this respect, the phenom-
enon shows the relation between the concern about safety and the 
actions made in relation with the young population. The fear that this 
age group gives rise to incites the governing bodies to try and reas-
sure the population and implement various action programmes for 
this purpose. Still, the question whether we distinguish the notions 
of youth at risk from that of youth as risk clearly enough is raised. 
The confusion can indeed have consequences. Moreover a policy 
that focuses too much on the management of fear could be coun-
terproductive such as deepening of the antagonism and resentment 
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resources to young people, paradoxical strengthening of the feeling 
of insecurity etc. The dispersal orders mentioned above also creates 
risks of privatisation of public spaces and fuelling up the exclusion 
mechanism. They also lead us to consider the concept of individual 
freedom in so far as this freedom can be anxiety-provoking for some 
people and engender the afore-mentioned defensive reactions.
Globally, it appears that the use of public spaces by young people 
has, over the last decades, rather decreased (less and less children 
now go to school unaccompanied) and has simultaneously changed 
(appropriation of some areas by certain groups). Restrictions to come 
and go, however, seem to be more the product of parental prescrip-
tions and certain individuals’ fears. The street therefore comes back 
into control through the exclusion of those who do not conform to 
the mass of consumers (Bannister et al., 2006). The management or 
even the instrumentation of fear actually serves the authorities in the 
governance of communities.
3 – Management of fear and governance
This instrumentation of the feeling of insecurity is further validated 
by two other European examples: the Polish and French cases.
Poland, ﬁrst of all, was characterised for a long time by a particularly 
high repressive tendency of its population when compared with the 
other European countries. From the 1960s till today, various studies 
(Kwasniewski, Kojder, 1979; Wojciechowska, 1994; Szymanowski, 
Szymanowska, 1996) have shown how high the rates of opinions in 
favour of death penalty or a general strengthening of sentences are. 
However we must note here that the concern about punishment is 
more pronounced when the population has to express themselves 
with abstract concepts than when they are asked about the relevance 
of death penalty for concrete cases. The Polish are also generally 
more inclined to consider their country as insecure rather than their 
local neighbourhood. This diffuse fear of crime was much exploited 
by politicians over the last years and largely taken over by media 
showing little concern about whether their coverage would fan up 
the ﬂames or not. If the brothers Kaczynski have thus been qualiﬁed 
as administrators of fear, it appears that the theme of insecurity was 
abundantly used for governance purposes (or to access governance 
positions).
The situation of French suburbs and the citizens’ fear of them was 
also a topic of debate. Again, but in different proportions and being 
aware that drawing hasty parallels would be irrelevant, the repeti-
tive incidents in the problem suburbs of some large towns in France 
regularly ﬁll many column inches. These occasional skirmishes 
sometimes lead to stigmatising sensitive neighbourhoods through 
the development of speciﬁc urban policies. The medias’ role, who 
act as a magnifying mirror of events and politicians (elected or cam-
6paigning), was therefore debated. The theme of the suburbs develops 
a deeply political dimension of governance and has an impact on 
the public opinion which is chronically cemented by various fears, 
objective and subjective, linked with urban insecurity. As a conse-
quence these overall fears and the ways they are tackled have an 
aftermath on social exclusion and the meaning of urban space.
II – SOCIAL EXCLUSION, URBAN SPACE AND GATED COMMUNITIES
The ﬁrst part of this synthesis focused on the perception of crime and 
the feeling of insecurity within our society. This second part aims 
at establishing the link between social exclusion, urban insecurity 
and the development of gated communities in Europe, new paradises 
produced by a brand new logic targeting security. However, let’s 
consider social exclusion ﬁrst.
1 – Social exclusion: how can it be deﬁned?
Social exclusion is a real debate that concerns all western societies. 
Even if it is widely talked about, no one seems to agree on a shared 
deﬁnition. Great poverty and factor of delinquency for some, inca-
pacity for some groups or individuals to beneﬁt from a decent stand-
ard of living for the others, this concept was constantly redeﬁned 
over time and according to criminological trends.
In the 1950s, the association poverty-crime, much in fashion until 
then, began to be massively rejected. Many studies showed indeed 
that poverty was far from being the only cause of crime and that 
other factors had to be taken into account. Some theoreticians started 
to develop an interest in the role of social networks and the way 
individuals share common values and exert an informal social con-
trol within their local neighbourhood or community. According to 
Janowitz, the structure of relational networks, or the density of social 
links, determine the propensity of a neighbourhood to embark on 
a process of self-regulation (mentioned by Carr, 2003), as well as 
the level of crime control and its intensity. These considerations and 
research were clearly in the same vein as the “social disorganization 
theory” established by Shaw and McKay. As early as 1942, they had 
both observed that the areas showing the highest crime rates were 
the same as those that were characterised by other kinds of social 
malaises and suggested that social disorganisation was the cause of 
the high and stable crime rate (Triplett et al., 2003).
The end of the twentieth century was an era of deep social transfor-
mations. After the post-war decades characterised by a very high 
employment rate, stable family structures and especially an active 
Welfare State, we observed the explosion of societies marked by 
structural unemployment, economic instability, the diminution of 
state interventionism and social support, but also by an ever increas-
ing instability within families and inter-personal relationships. The 
growing individualism, the fall of informal social control2, and espe-
2 Due to an ever-increasing social mobility and the dispersal of  individuals looking for new 
areas where they can invest for their capital.
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fare State and to the fear of unemployment, played, and still do, an 
important role in what is called social exclusion.
The phenomenon of social exclusion therefore results from numer-
ous causes. It generally includes an economical, political and spatial 
exclusion as well as restricted access to the main resources such as 
information, medical care, housing, and enforcement of security, law 
and order (Bawin-Legros et al., 2001).
2 – Social exclusion: the cause of urban insecurity and 
polarisation of society?
The question of insecurity, which has been making headlines for 
years and keeps administrations and civil servants busy on a daily 
basis, is very often approached in its urban dimension that is the 
most visible and the most perceived by the population. To address 
it, police forces and administrations are trying to ﬁnd balanced solu-
tions between prevention and repression, between the ﬁght against 
delinquency and incivilities and the reduction of exclusions, and be-
tween the rise of quality of life and the reduction of the feeling of 
insecurity.
Urban insecurity can be associated with another phenomenon that is 
indirectly linked with social exclusion: the polarisation of society. 
On the one hand, a majority of individuals who have an employ-
ment, show a civic attitude towards other citizens and live in a stable 
family structure, and, on the other hand, a disorganised and criminal 
or criminalistic minority dependent on social support and who live 
in unstable and dysfunctional family structures. This polarisation is 
also characterised spatially with, on the one side, the integrated indi-
viduals and, on the other one, the excluded individuals living in the 
poorest neighbourhoods, geographically separated from the rest of 
the population.
The fear of crime, constantly taken over by the media and associated 
with a lack of trust in the public authorities and justice as well as to 
the always more frequent resort to private protection systems, leads 
some categories of the very wealthy population to invest in a secured 
residence, at a distance from towns that are regarded as a source of 
delinquency. We have observed the emergence of gated communi-
ties for a couple of years now. The conception of these gated and 
secured neighbourhoods varies and changes according to the vari-
ous national and cultural contexts. These gated communities can be 
found all over the world, especially in southern countries where se-
curity issues are more frequent, from Johannesburg to São Paulo, to 
Nairobi or La Paz, but also in the United States and now in Europe, 
mainly in the United Kingdom, France, Portugal or in other eastern 
European countries.
83 - Gated communities: a response for insecurity and fear of 
crime or a desire to live “amongst one’s peers”?
Appearing in the 1930s and then expanding for good in the 1960s-
1970s, the gated communities are on a large scale linked with the 
intensiﬁcation of the urbanisation of outlying suburbs. Their devel-
opment is a complex phenomenon that involves various factors.
According to Le Goix (2003), these new neighbourhoods ﬁnd their 
origin in four elements:
The anti-urban romantic ideology that fostered the suburban   •
 model;
The development of a legal structure, the co-ownerships,   •
 which applies private law regulations;
The increased desire for security that encourages the enclo  •
 sure of residences and neighbourhood watch;
The exclusive aspect of these new residential complexes en  •
 compassing values of the aristocratic club or of the religious  
 community and the rejection of social mixing.
In Britain, several studies show that the issue of insecurity is not 
always at the top of the list of the population’s concerns. The devel-
opment of gated communities appears to be mainly the result of the 
erosion of the ideals in social justice and equality, the shift from an 
informal system to a formal system of social control and particularly, 
the ever-growing desire to live with people with a similar status and 
beneﬁt from a whole range of services.
The majority of the residents of this type of communities does not 
originate, contrary to public opinion, from the wealthiest classes, 
but indeed from the middle classes. For those who belong to the 
wealthiest classes, the “advantageous and convenient” aspect clearly 
prevails. The cost of housing within an ultra-secured gated commu-
nity is also an important factor. The more expensive it is the more 
interesting the advantages are and the more the standard of living is 
considered as privileged.
In Hungary, more than the two ﬁfths of the new buildings con-
structed in Budapest between 2002 and 2007 include security de-
vices (alarms, armoured doors, cameras etc.). In this country from 
the former eastern bloc the democratic transition, the shift from a 
planned economy to a market economy and the integration into the 
European Union had two major consequences: an increased social 
polarisation and the weakening of the state regulation.
These two elements enabled not only the development of private and 
secured housing but also a new distribution between the residents 
from the new and modern housings that are implemented with all 
the necessary conveniences and the residents from precast buildings 
dating from the communist period. The residents of the ﬁrst type of 
housing belong to a new wealthy middle class, in comparison with 
9more under-privileged classes. The development of gated communi-
ties in Hungary, which is more than just a matter of insecurity, is 
linked, on the one hand, with the political transition that permitted 
the liberalisation and the opening of the market, and, on the other 
hand, with the emergence of a wealthier middle class, wishing to 
differentiate from the others and to adopt the same lifestyle as their 
European peers.
In Portugal, the appearance of these gated and secured communities 
also grew exponentially from the mid-1980s. Therefore, in the region 
of Lisbon, these new secured buildings are mainly located in seaside 
resort towns (Cascais) and more touristic places (Lisbon, Sintra). 
If security is again often mentioned, the people living in these new 
habitations also mention green areas, the cleanliness and the regular 
maintenance of the residences as the major inﬂuential motives in 
their choice.
Social cohesion and the fact of “living amongst one’s peers”, how-
ever, do not seem to be factors inﬂuencing the choice of living in 
such a community.
Finally, the secured housing estates which are initially the result of 
private estate operations do not hesitate in some cases to claim and 
obtain a political autonomy, thus establishing themselves as munici-
palities in order to redirect the residents’ taxes and duties thus cre-
ating entirely self managed, and even secessionists, private spaces 
(e.g.: the region of Los Angeles, twelve gated communities have be-
come municipalities such as that of Canyon Lake in 1991).
This poses the question of the urban fragmentation and brings us 
back to the question raised earlier about the privatisation of the pub-
lic space and about one of its components: security.
Dream-merchants or tranquillity-sellers, the catalogues offering this 
type of habitations to potential future purchasers seem indeed to be 
promising a “safe” life to individuals in search of belonging to an 
“exclusive” class of privileged people. Yet, beyond the privileged 
minority’s well being, we can still see the shadow of the debate men-
tioned earlier between reality and perception of crime, security and 
feeling of insecurity, this dialogue being likely to engender a social 
aftermath in terms of exclusion or solidarity.
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